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Viewing cable 09KABUL3867, AUSTRALIANS EXPAND AUSAID, INCREASE CIVILIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL3867 2009-12-03 11:11 2011-01-20 08:08 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO6327
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHBUL #3867/01 3371158
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031158Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3710
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0316
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0711
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003867 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS NATO AF
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIANS EXPAND AUSAID, INCREASE CIVILIAN 
CONTRIBUTIONS/ REPORT TRIBAL INTEREST IN RECONCILIATION 
 
Clas...
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003867 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS NATO AF
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIANS EXPAND AUSAID, INCREASE CIVILIAN 
CONTRIBUTIONS/ REPORT TRIBAL INTEREST IN RECONCILIATION 

Classified By: CDA Joseph Mussomeli. Reasons: 1.4 (b)&(d). 

1. (C) SUMMARY: In his pre-departure outcall December 
3, Australian Ambassador Martin Quinn made no indication 
of a possible troop increase but noted Australia plans 
to increase civilian contributions, including by 
increasing police advisors from three to twenty-five. 
The Australian Special Ops task force will continue to 
work closely with the US Special Ops forces, but the 
Australian focus will be moving toward new initiatives 
and deployment of civilians, including AUSAID 
development assistance in less-controlled areas. Quinn 
noted that Afghans in rural areas say they are tired of 
fighting and welcome reintegration programs. 
End Summary. 

2. (C) In a December 3 meeting Australian Ambassador 
Martin Quinn recounted to Ambassador Eikenberry that 
earlier that day FM Spanta told him that GIRoA is still 
unhappy about the London conference. Quinn also said 
that during Australian PM Kevin Rudd's November 11 visit 
with Australian troops in Uruzgan, Rudd had delivered 
(by phone) a tough message to Karzai. According to 
Quinn, Karzai had blamed POTUS for Afghanistan's current 
problems in a rambling incoherent response. Quinn did 
not elaborate but noted that the Government of Australia 
was unhappy about comments Karzai made in his November 9 
NPR interview with Margaret Warner in which Karzai said 
the West is not in Afghanistan for the sake of 
Afghanistan, but to fight the war on terror. 

3. (C) Observers, perspectives of the political and 
security situation in Afghanistan had been more 
optimistic in early 2008, but attitudes have swung from 
too optimistic to too pessimistic, opined Quinn. Policy 
shouldn't be determined based on optimism or pessimism, 
assessed Quinn, we just need to keep working at it. 
Uruzgan had been a mess a couple of years ago, 
troubled by lots of tribal problems, but with good 
efforts, today it is much more stable and secure. 
Australia plans to continue to increase its development 
projects in Afghanistan and is moving into less 
controlled areas such as Dai Kundi, where new projects 
include construction of a gravel road. 

Tribal Interest in Reintegration; Expansion of 
Development Assistance and Increasing Civilian 
Contributions 
--------------------------------------------- -- 

4. (C) Ambassador Quinn said his key message is that 
Australia is in Afghanistan for the long haul. The 
Australians have been talking to Afghans living in 
tribal areas who are tired of fighting and are 
interested in reintegration -- and want to benefit 
from development assistance programs, continued 
Quinn. On the military side the Australians had 
increased their troops contributions from 1100 to 
1550 this year, but also plan to increase 
contributions of civilians and will increase the 
number of police advisors from three to twenty-five. 
AUSAID is now in Afghanistan and will undertake new 
initiatives. The Australian military is moving 
away from reconstruction and focusing increasingly 
on training. Although the Australian Special Ops 
task force will continue to work closely with the 
US Special Ops forces, a large part of the 
Australian focus will be moving toward new 
initiatives and deployment of civilians. 

Keeping Up Pressure on the Dutch to Stay 
---------------------------------------- 
5. (C) The Australians are complying with requests 
that they keep pressure on the Dutch to keep a 
battle group in Uruzgan, confided Quinn. He 
predicted that the Netherlands will probably 
keep a PRT, but noted The Hague is under 
tremendous pressure to withdraw their troops - 
especially from one of the ruling coalition 
partners. 

New Australian Ambassador to Arrive in Late December 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
6. (U) The meeting was the out-call for Quinn, who 
departs Afghanistan December 3 to return to Canberra. 

KABUL 00003867 002 OF 002 


His successor Paul Foley is scheduled to arrive in 
Kabul around December 28. 

Mussomeli