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Viewing cable 09CAIRO1411, EGYPT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR A CLASSIFIED BRIEFING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CAIRO1411 2009-07-22 10:10 2011-02-16 21:09 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #1411/01 2031017
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 221017Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3245
INFO RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS CAIRO 001411 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA (IRWIN) AND PM (ARCHETTO) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT:  COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR A CLASSIFIED BRIEFING 
ON MK 54 LIGHTWEIGHT TORPEDO IN VIEW OF  FUTURE PROCUREMENT TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT NATIONAL DEFENSE MISSION REF: A. EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF REQUEST (09-319) Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU). Please protect accordingly.
1.(SBU) Description. In ref (a), the Government of Egypt (GOE) submitted a Letter of Request (LOR) for a classified briefing for the MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo (LWT). The primary mission of the MK 54 LWT is ship and force self defense against submarines. This torpedo would eventually replace the MK 46 Mod 5A Surface Warfare (SW) Torpedo in the Egyptian Navy (EN) inventory and potentially replace other torpedo systems in EN vessels. The EN is currently also searching for a replacement for the Chinese and British Made LWT in the Hainan Class Fast Attack (Anti-Submarine) Craft.

2.(SBU) Reason the purchaser desires the articles and services. The EN already possesses the US made MK 46 Mod 5A (SW) LWT. According to NAVSEA briefings to the EN the MK 46 LWT will be phased out of the USN inventory and become increasingly unsupportable in the next 15 years. The EN needs to develop a long range replacement for the MK 46 LWT. LWT are primarily a self-defense weapon critical to the Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission of the EN. The EN is considering LWT from other countries including German and British made weapons.

3.(SBU) How the articles or services would affect the recipient's force structure. The MK 54 LWT would not significantly change EN force structure but provide the EN with a more modern and supportable variant of an existing weapon. The MK 54 incorporates digital electronics in the seeker head and fire control system but retains the same warhead and propulsion as the existing MK46 LWT. The MK54 is produced in an export variant.

4.(SBU) How the articles or services would contribute to both the U.S. and the recipient's defense/security goals. The MK 54 LWT is currently being fielded in the USN and will be supported as the only LWT in the USN inventory for the foreseeable future. Having a common torpedo would potentially increase interoperability and ensure that EN systems and maintenance infrastructure were supported in the case of a need for shared assets or combined operations.

5. (SBU) Justification for the type and quantity of articles or services requested. THE EN currently maintains an inventory of one hundred fifty-four (154) MK 46 Mod A (SW) LWT. These torpedoes are currently fully supported by the USN. However, this support will decrease over the next 15 years and the current technology will be obsolete by the early 2020's. The classified brief is the first step in procuring a follow-on weapon. No other LWT is US made or in the USN inventory.

6.(SBU) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the introduction of a new warfighting capability to the nation or region. Combatant Commander's concurrence will be provided separately.

7.(SBU) Anticipated reactions of the neighboring nations. We do not anticipate negative reaction from neighboring countries. The MK 54 torpedo is a defensive weapon and would not present a significant increase in EN Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability.

8.(SBU) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles. The EN has a history of being able to account for, safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the MK 46 Mod 5A (SW) LWT they currently possess. They employ the MK 46 Mod 5A (SW) LWT from two different platforms.

9. (SBU) Training required either in-country or in the United States and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S. trainers in country. There would be a limited amount of both in-country and U.S. based training for this eventual purchase. All the operators and maintenance personnel would need to travel to the United States for initial training. The training received in the United States is only preliminary training and must be followed up with in-country training. No negative reaction from any neighboring country with regards to the training would be expected. Egypt currently does extensive training in the United States. There are also several Follow-on Technical Support teams for Ex-USN assets already in country.

10.(SBU) Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that might be required as a result of providing the article. The impact of U.S. presence required by this acquisition in Egypt will be minimal. There is already a heavy American footprint in Egypt supporting the US weapon systems Egypt currently possesses. Permanently assigned teams of long- and short-term contractors are in country already. The amount of US personnel required in country for the purchase of the MK 54 LWT would be an extremely small portion of the overall footprint and go virtually unnoticed.

11.(SBU) Source of financing and the economic impact of the proposed acquisition. Egypt plans to use Foreign Military Financing to cover all the costs associated with the acquisition, transport, supply, infrastructure, and training for the purchase of the MK 54 LWT. Egypt will only be able to make the purchase if the amortized payment schedule can fit within the FMF budget for Egypt. Further, Egypt will budget to fully cover the Total Package Approach for this acquisition and maintain the Total Package Approach for the other GoE programs.

12.(SBU) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed acquisition. None.

13.(SBU) A plan for end-use monitoring for sensitive and advanced warfighting technology and the SAO's plan for compliance verification. The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) Egypt has a robust Golden Sentry Program. The Golden Sentry Program representative and Security Assistance Officer (SAO) responsible for the program will coordinate for review and maintenance of required documentation. All parties will maintain serial number logs of all components within or transferred from the inventory and will conduct the mandated inspections as required. This coordination will ensure that historical copies of all EUM inspection results and customer's physical security and accountability control plans remain on file. The Egyptian military currently has 154 MK 46 Mod A LWT in country. Egypt has maintained accountability and security of these weapons without unauthorized loss, theft, or access to date. The GOE has expressed the willingness to meet U.S. guidelines for accountability and security of these new aircraft, and the Office of Military Cooperation will conduct End Use Monitoring of all required components if this request is approved.

14.(SBU) Recommendation whether the USG should approve transfer of the article and justification. The country team endorses the Egyptian procurement of MK 54 LWT. The MK 54 is a robust, modern lightweight Torpedo produced in an export version that would enable the EN to continue long-term use of a US Anti-Submarine (ASW) weapons system and would allow for maintaining situational awareness and influence in the EN ASW program. This eventual purchase would also better enable Egypt's ability to engage in coalition operations as the number of other US allies, friends and partners who possess the MK54 increases. This provides inherent interoperability which benefits both the United States and the Government of Egypt.