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Viewing cable 07KABUL3848, AFGHAN POLICE TRAINING: SHIFT TO FOCUSED DISTRICT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL3848 2007-11-15 10:10 2011-01-23 19:07 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO7118
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #3848/01 3191054
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151054Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1461
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4279
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3705
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003848 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS MARR AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN POLICE TRAINING: SHIFT TO FOCUSED DISTRICT 
DEVELOPMENT 

REF: KABUL 3054 

Classified By: Ambassador William Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1. (C) SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION: Since the fall of the Taliban 
in 2001, Afghan National Police (ANP) development has lagged 
behind that of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Despite the 
training of over 70,000 ANP individuals and advances in 
equipping and recruiting, the police remain largely 
ineffective and corrupt. At the same time, as security 
conditions have deteriorated, the proportion of ANP 
fatalities has climbed and is now markedly higher than that 
of ANA in high threat areas. To enhance ANP effectiveness 
both in the counterinsurgency role and in traditional 
policing functions, Combined Security Transition Command ) 
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is working closely with the Ministry of 
Interior (MOI), Embassy, ISAF and international community 
(IC) donors to launch a new program that will train and 
develop whole police units district by district. With MOI 
leadership, the Focused District Development (FDD) Program is 
a new strategy that seeks to make the district uniformed 
police unit the &building block8 for developing the ANP, 
emulating to the extent possible the approach that has proven 
effective with the ANA. 

2. (C) District police units will be removed from their 
district as a unit for eight weeks training, reequipped, and 
paired with a Police Mentoring Team (PMT) for follow-on 
training support. Other police units will be put in place to 
provide policing during the unit,s training period. 
Consultations are also taking place with IRoA officials, 
USAID, UNAMA and other IC donors to coordinate the delivery 
of governance and development assistance to the districts 
selected for FDD. The FDD program is scheduled to begin its 
initial training phase in late December, starting with seven 
districts in five provinces. There will be challenges to 
address as the program goes forward, including shortfalls in 
police mentoring teams, accountability, prioritization and 
absorptive capacity for assistance while meeting recruiting 
goals. But by focusing train-and-equip resources ) 
including limited numbers of police mentoring teams ) on a 
handful of districts at one time, FDD has the potential over 
time to provide an effective platform for security, 
development and governance advances throughout Afghanistan. 
END SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION. 

--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
THE FULL FDD CYCLE AND GOALS: RETRAIN, REEQUIP, RENOVATE 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 

3. (C) The FDD program envisions manning, training, 
equipping, and providing facilities to an entire district 
police unit at one time. Objectives include recruiting to 
full authorized levels, replacing ineffective leaders, and 
transferring the unit to one of INL,s Regional Training 
Centers (RTCs) for training. The full FDD training cycle is 
scheduled as follows: 

a) assessment and recruiting: approximately 60 days 
b) placement of temporary covering security force: 10 days 
c) training of district police force ) 8 weeks plus movement 
time 
d) reinsertion of district police force into district: one 
week 
e) close PMT overwatch: 2 to 4 months 

4. (C) CSTC-A's goal under FDD is to train and reform all 
police districts in the country in three to four years, 
predicated in part on the expectation that the program will 
create its own momentum as other districts, seeing enhanced 
security and development benefits, will elect to improve 
their operations on their own initiative. 

KABUL 00003848 002 OF 004 



5. (C) To allow the staff of an entire police district to be 
trained simultaneously, Afghan National Civil Order Police 
(ANCOP) companies, supported as necessary in some areas by 
ANA units, will temporarily replace the entire district 
police force while the latter undergo training. 

6. (C) Those policemen or new recruits who have not had any 
training would receive the basic course; policemen who have 
already attended the basic course would attend a newly 
developed advanced course; and senior officers (second 
lieutenant and above) within the district would go through an 
officers, course, also newly developed by INL-contracted 
civilian police mentors assigned to CSTC-A and approved by 
the INL/NAS office in Kabul. All courses are eight weeks in 
length. To enhance unit coherence, all ranks will be brought 
together in the final week of instruction to train and work 
as a single unit. PMTs will remain with the district police 
during their time at the Regional Training Center, 
supplementing the INL courses with additional and 
reinforcement training as required. 

7. (C) District police units, equipment and vehicles will be 
assessed for usability; after the training period, their 
equipment will either be returned, refurbished, or replaced 
at the end of the course. Even as their weapons are 
evaluated for usability, trainees will continue to receive 
training with the same type of weapon. At the same time, 
CSTC-A and MOI will work in the trainees, home district to 
improve facilities, establish connectivity with other 
elements of the security sector, and establish both formal 
and informal working relationships with local leaders. 

8. (C) Once the district police complete the eight-week 
training cycle, they will return to their district and 
reassume their duties. As police units are returned home, 
ANCOP units will also remain for a short transition period. 
CSTC-A-sponsored PMTs, composed of professional police and 
military experts, will remain full time for at least two to 
four months with the newly-trained and equipped district 
police units. 

9. (C) In preparation for the initial training phase, CSTC-A 
is sending regional assessment teams in mid-November to all 
first-tranche districts. Led by an MOI general officer and 
the PMT, and consisting of interagency U.S., Afghan 
government (IRoA) and IC experts, the teams will assess the 
police force, the status of rule of law and governance in the 
districts, to determine the number of new recruits, specific 
training, equipment, facilities, and other supporting 
requirements needed, and to shape the evolution of rule of 
law and governance in the district, as well as the linkage to 
the provincial government. 

--------------------------------------------- --- 
DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS TO FOLLOW ENHANCED SECURITY 
--------------------------------------------- --- 

10. (C) Consultations are also taking place with IRoA 
officials, USAID, UNAMA and other IC donors to coordinate the 
delivery of development and governance assistance to the 
districts selected for FDD. This will ensure that as 
regional security is enhanced, districts will benefit 
directly from energy, infrastructure, rule of law and other 
programs that U.S. and allied Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs) will help local and regional officials to coordinate. 
Ghulam Jelani Popal, the new Director General of the 
Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and who 
reports directly to President Karzai (reftel), has expressed 
keen interest in the FDD program. Post is seeking to 
facilitate consultations between IDLG and CSTC-A on how FDD 
can strengthen local governance in Afghanistan and how the 

KABUL 00003848 003 OF 004 


FDD program can be linked to Popal's proposal for 
district-based local self-defense forces and other governance 
initiatives. 

----------------------- 
FIRST TRANCHE DISTRICTS 
----------------------- 

11. (C) FDD training of the first selected district police 
units is scheduled to start in late December, with each full 
cycle taking approximately six to eight months for 
completion, including monitoring, reassessment, retraining, 
and sustainment training. CSTC-A consulted closely with ISAF 
HQ, the ISAF Regional Commands, MOI HQ and senior police 
officials in developing recommendations to present to 
Interior Minister Zarar for choosing the first tranche of 
districts. In addition to MOI input on political and 
policing factors, ISAF operational planning considerations 
will be a significant concern for the first two FDD cycles, 
in order to complement -- and not complicate -- other planned 
operations. As FDD planning extends further into the future, 
it will instead help shape ISAF operational planning and more 
readily synchronize with specific development and governance 
projects for identified districts. 

12. (C) The districts chosen for the first training cycle 
include: 

(a) Qalat, Shah Joy, and Tarang wa Jaldak districts in Zabul 
province; 

(b) Zurmat in Paktia province; 

(c) Tag Ab in Kapisa Province; 

(d) Chahar Dara in Kunduz province; 

(e) Bala Buluk in Farah Province. 

With the exception of Chahar Dara in the relatively quiet 
north, these districts pose varying levels of security 
challenges, including key strategic infrastructure (e.g., the 
ring road running through the three Zabul districts), known 
Taliban transit points (Tag Ab, Zurmat), or significant 
political import (Bala Buluk lies adjacent to three districts 
recently overrun by Taliban forces in Farah). 

---------------- 
CHALLENGES AHEAD 
---------------- 

13. (C) MOI officials, initially slow to warm to the FDD 
concept, are becoming more involved and actively welcoming 
the program. Interior Minister Zarar is taking an active 
lead, and this has translated down the ranks; however, 
broadening MOI and government-wide support will depend on 
achieving early successes in the first seven trial districts. 


14. (C) The PMTs will play a key role in the FDD program, 
including the assessment and validation of the newly-trained 
district police units, as well as subsequent periodic 
reassessments and retraining. As critical as PMTs are to the 
success of police training, personnel resources have thus far 
not been available to meet CSTC-A,s request for 2,500 
additional military and civilian police mentors to staff the 
PMTs throughout the country. These would augment the police 
trainers and mentors already working in Afghanistan. At 
present, CSTC-A covers this personnel shortfall by 
concentrating on approximately one third of districts, 
including having a single PMT conduct area coverage of 
several districts in some cases. FDD, however, will require 

KABUL 00003848 004 OF 004 


concentration on specific districts since PMTs will not have 
the option of spreading efforts over multiple districts. 

15. (C) CSTC-A has been consulting with IC players, in 
particular the EU Police mission (EUPOL), to build IC support 
for the concept and to tap IC resources. EU-member state 
embassy contacts tell us they find FDD a credible approach to 
putting police development back on track; however, it is 
unclear how much concrete support international partners are 
willing to lend to the plan. CSTC-A remains open to 
incorporating EU police trainers into CSTC-A-sponsored PMTs, 
but EU interlocutors have been hesitant, noting that it would 
require a change to the EUPOL mandate to place EU police 
mentors at the district level, and may have implications for 
broader NATO-EU relations. Some individual nations, such as 
Norway and Canada, have offered assistance outside of the 
EUPOL mandate, and CSTC-A welcomes such assistance because it 
is not constrained by EUPOL limitations. 

16. (C) Corruption remains a concern. Simultaneously with 
FDD, CSTC-A will press ahead on separate timelines to 
complete in the next six months the issuance of 
identification cards to all ANP, ensure all police districts 
are using the electronic payment system, and maximize where 
possible the payment of salaries through electronic 
transfers. FDD will provide an opportunity to press forward 
with rank and pay reform and ANP pay parity with the ANA 
which, despite having been approved by the international 
community in September, have not yet been fully implemented 
-- or have been implemented inconsistently -- in many 
districts. Also, the presence of PMTs for 2-4 months 
following the group training will not only ensure sustainment 
training, but will also provide a crucial reinforcement of 
accountability requirements for U.S.-provided equipment. 
Following the completion of initial training in the 
districts, we will have to assess the priority development 
and governance needs, and the absorptive capacity of the 
districts. 

17. (C) A critical issue identified in the CSTC-A concept of 
operations will be the removal or neutralization of corrupt, 
criminal and/or inept district police chiefs. Afghan legal 
constraints bar the outright removal of officers except in 
the case of a judicial finding, which is a slow and 
unreliable process. CSTC-A,s JAG team has prepared a draft 
MOI disciplinary instruction that is currently under review 
within the MOI; in it, alternative approaches are explored 
that could include suspension without pay, demotion by up to 
two ranks, and involuntary retirement. Even if new 
disciplinary measures are approved, it will remain a 
challenge to empower MOI officials to impose discipline 
involving rank or pay in the face of inevitable interference 
from outside or senior influences. In addition, district ANP 
patrolmen are often loyal to their chiefs on the basis of 
tribal and other personal relationships. When their district 
commanders are either removed or quit, ANP personnel have 
sometimes deserted or abandoned their posts as a consequence. 

18. (C) CSTC-A is working with the MOI on other personnel 
issues. FDD success will depend on the ability of the MOI to 
recruit new personnel into the ANP. A September 2007 CSTC-A 
survey of about 76 percent of police districts indicated a 
shortfall of some 5,500 personnel from authorized billets. 
With advice from CSTC-A mentors, MOI recruiters are 
redoubling their efforts to hire additional recruits. It 
will also be critical to ensure that the pace of ANCOP 
recruitment and training is maintained, to ensure sufficient 
ANCOP strength to provide the back-fill police presence as 
district units undergo their two-month training period out of 
their district. 
WOOD