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Viewing cable 05KABUL5181, KUNDUZ POLITICS OF CORRUPTION IN THE BAGHLAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05KABUL5181 2005-12-20 12:12 2011-01-23 19:07 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005181 

SIPDIS 

NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
DEPT FOR SA/FO, AMBASSADOR QUINN, SA/PAB, S/CT, SA/A 
STATE PASS USAID/W FOR ANE 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 

SENSITIVE 

E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF GE
SUBJECT: KUNDUZ POLITICS OF CORRUPTION IN THE BAGHLAN 
POLICE FORCES 

1. (U) Summary: Highway Police forces throughout the 
north and northeast and Afghan National Police (ANP) forces 
in Baghlan province are both dominated by Tajik warlords 
and drug traffickers. General Abdul Khalil has assigned 
former jihadi/Hezb-i-Islami loyalists from Baghlans 
Andarab District to the majority of positions in the 
e 
Highway Police. Under General Mustafas influence, General 
Mir Alam and other Tajik warlords also dominate the ANP in 
Baghlan. Patrons in the Afghan Ministry of Interior 
support and reinforce competing power players in Baghlan 
without regard to corruption and drug trafficking. END 
SUMMARY. 

---------------------- 
HIGHWAY POLICE NETWORK 
---------------------- 
2. (SBU) Since 2003, General Abdul Khalil Andarabi has 
been leading a government condoned drug cartel known as the 
North and Northeast Highway Police Brigade (also known as 
Second Brigade), controlling the roads and much of the 
narco-trafficking from Faryab to Badakhshan provinces. 
Khalil, a former Tajik jihadi from Baghlans Andarab 
District, was a Jumbesh battalion commander under the 
Ishmaelite leader Sayyed Jafar Naderi. Khalils father, 
Juma Khan, was an eminent commander of Hezb-i-Islami in the 
Andarab area, hence the influence of his fathrs 
supporters in the North and Northeast Highway Police 
Department. 

t. 

3. (SBU) General Khalil reportedly has had the support of 
two very influential Ministry of Interior (MoI) officials: 
the Acting Minister of Interior, Mr. Zarar, and a former 
Deputy Minister, General Helaluddin. Mr. Helaluddin, also 
a Tajik from Andarab, was a military pilot during 
Najibullahs time, and was then linked to Jumbesh. He 
became Deputy Minister during the first transitional 
government. Helaluddin recently won a seat in the Wolesi 
Jirga representing Baghlan Province. General Khalil was 
allegedly an active supporter of Helaluddins campaign. 

4. (SBU) Since Khalils appointment, eight of the 12 (67 
percent) most influential positions in the Highway police 
department have been given to the people from Andarab, and 
a total of eight (out of 12) people are the former Hezb-i 
Islami activists and sympathizers of Khalils father. 
Khalils cronyism has resulted in an ethnic repartition of 
the department. At the highest level in the Highway Police 
lice 
Department (battalion commanders and general staff), 11 out 
of 12 are Tajik, while only one person, the Deputy Highway Police 
Chief, is a Pashtun. The latter is professional and seems to be 
without political affiliation. (Nevertheless, the Deputy 
Highway Police Chief, Colonel Nasser, does not have a 
spotless reputation, as he, too, worked a number of months 
for Bashir Baghlani when the latter was Baghlans 
provincial governor under the Taliban regime.) Khalils 
cronyism is readily evident in the fact that two of 12 
important positions, namely the Reconnaissance Officer and 
the Commander of the First Battalion, were openly offered 
to Khalils uncle and to the nephew of General Helaluddin, 
respectively. 

5. (SBU) Political connections between Baghlan and Kabul 
have proven lucrative for Helaluddin and Khalil (both from 
Andarab), and to some extent Acting Minister of Interior 
Zarar. This political web of support has been highly 
influential in the narco-trafficking throughout the North 
th 
and Northeast regions from Badakhshan (the regions main 
producer of opium and heroin) to Faryab. However, this 
political network of drug traffickers faces stiff 
competition in Baghlan and Kunduz. General Mustafa is 
another native of Andarab who, along with his group of 
merry men affiliated with Hezb-i-Naween (HNA)/Jamiat, runs 
the competing trafficking rings in the Northeast Region. 
Mustafa is joined in this endeavor by the native of Kunduz 
and former commander of the 54th Division, current Baghlan 
Chief of Police Mir Alam. 

------------------------- 
PROVINCIAL POLICE NETWORK 
------------------------- 

6. (SBU) General Mir Alam. The situation in Baghlan 
started to deteriorate after the June 2005 appointment of 
General Mir Alam as Provincial Chief of Police. Mir Alam 
is a Tajik, former Jihadi and former commander of 54th 
Division, affiliated to HNA and still linked to various 
armed groups. Apparently, the decision to appoint Mir Alam 
as Chief of Police was taken without consulting Mr. Jalali, 
the former Minister of Interior. Since the collapse of 
Taliban regime, the followers of General Mustafa, former 
commander of the 20th Division, and people linked to 
HNA/Jamiat have acted as the primary decision-making group 
within the provincial police headquarters. Mir Alam is but 
the most recent to join this brotherhood under Mustafa. 
Mir Alam is linked to Qanooni and Marshal Fahim and is also 
said to share a very good relationship with Acting Minister 
of Interior Zarar. 

7. (SBU) With Mir Alams new police administration and 
the dismissal of most of the local authorities (district 
and provincial), 12 of 16 (75 percent) of the new chiefs of 
police in the province (District Chiefs of Police and the 
Provincial Chief of Police) are the followers of 
HNA/Jamiat. Of the 16 principal officers, 11 are Tajik, 
four are Pashtun, and one is Uzbek. 

8. (SBU) Unlike the highway police, there is more 
diversity among the senior officers of the ANP in Baghlan: 
two of the seven most influential authorities in this 
department are professional police officers, apparently 
without political affiliation; three are linked to the 
Andarabi commanders (HNA/Jamiat); but, most intriguing, is 
that two of the seven senior officers are closely linked to 
the Chief of Highway Police, General Khalil. The ethnic 
breakdown for senior leadership in the Baghlan Police 
Headquarters is 86 percent Tajik and 14 percent Pashtun. 

9. (SBU) The June 2005 appointment of General Mir Alam 
(linked to Hezb-i-Naween), followed by the September 2005 
appointment of Mohammad Alam Rasekh as the Baghlan 
provincial governor (linked to Jamiat), has definitely 
reinforced the Tajik dominance within the province and 
specifically within the police department. Due to the 
continued vacancy of the Minister of Interior position, MoI 
Deputies like General Dawud and Acting Minister Zarar are 
able to exert great influence in Baghlan and reinforce 
HNA/Jamiat control over all aspects of society, especially 
the riches of narco-trafficking. 

10. (SBU) PRT COMMENT: The rivalry between the ANP and 
the highway police is becoming more and more pronounced, 
particularly over the control of drug trafficking and the 
general domination of Baghlan province. Rather than providing 
stability, the police forces are among the principal 
destabilizing factors in the province. The recurrent theme in the 
northeast region remains Kabuls lack of political will to remove 
known warlords and drug traffickers from office, especially 
police chiefs. Dominant figures such as Khalil and Mir Alam 
continually undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan central 
government, yet wield enough influence with powerful figures in 
Kabul to maintain positions of authority indefinitely. If the 
security reform, DIAG and counter narcotics efforts are to 
succeed, the police forces of Northeast Afghanistan must be 
purged of their corrupt officers. 
END PRT COMMENT.